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ARTICLE

NEVER LET A GOOD CRISIS LEAD YOU
ASTRAY: THE LESSONS OF CHRISTIAN
REALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY FOR PUBLIC
POLICY
RICHARD M. ESENBERG
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of Christian Realism associated with Reinhold Niebuhr
might be generally defined as
a reminder of our limits and an affirmation of our hope. It tells us
that our knowledge is imperfect, our plans are incomplete, and our
expectations are inevitably distorted by self-interest. We are always
trying to overcome these limitations, and we are often partly
successful; but our partial successes make it all the more important
to remember that the limits remain, mocking our confidence with
ironic reversals and threatening our pride with forces beyond our
control. Final answers and permanent solutions elude us. 1
Although there are certainly concepts in Catholic Social Thought that
seem to share much with the ideas associated with Christian Realism, it is
my purpose here to treat Christian Realism as a distinct—or at least
separate—set of perspectives on law and public policy and to explore how
it might interact with the insights of Catholic social teaching. In particular, I
want to consider how Christian Realism might be informed by—and how it
might inform—the Catholic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.
Subsidiarity is most often defined as
that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or
changed . . . [that j]ust as it is gravely wrong to take from
individuals what they can accomplish by their own initiative and
industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and
at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to
1. ROBIN W. LOVIN, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND THE NEW REALITIES 1 (2008).
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assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and
subordinate organizations can do.2
Solidarity, on the other hand,
is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary,
it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the
common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each
individual, because we are all really responsible for all. 3
There is a real friction in integrating subsidiarity and solidarity. This
difficulty reflects, in my view, a creative tension serving an underlying
unity. The two are often criticized as conflicting generalities—the latter
calling for greater social cohesiveness and collective effort and the former
supporting greater social decentralization and private autonomy. 4
While subsidiarity indeed emphasizes the freedom and responsibility of
individuals, voluntary associations, and units of local government,
subsidiarity is not, as is sometimes claimed, a merely “instrumental” or
“jurisdictional” principle.5 Subsidiarity is, to the contrary, a moral judgment
about human empowerment. It suggests that public policy ought to be
evaluated in terms of its empowerment of individuals and the voluntary and
mediating associations into which they gather.6 Solidarity, on the other
hand, is the objective toward which these persons and associations—freed
by subsidiarity—are to strive. 7 It is not so much a restriction on subsidiarity
2. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno ¶ 79 (May 15, 1931), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_
quadragesimo-anno_en.html.
3. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis ¶ 38 (Dec. 30, 1987), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_
sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html.
4. In the context of the adoption of subsidiarity as a constitutive principle of the European
Union, one commentator noted that subsidiarity might be called “an empty shell devoid of
concrete substance . . . a golden rule, a fashionable term, a concept with which anyone might
agree in principle, because all can define for themselves what it means in any specific case.” Paul
D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616,
628 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Jerome M. Organ, Subsidiarity and Solidarity: Lenses for Assessing the
Appropriate Locus for Environmental Regulation and Enforcement, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 262,
264 (2008) (“[T]he principle of subsidiarity is not so much a foundational principle of Catholic
Social Thought on its own as it is an instrumental principle designed to promote one of the
foundational principles of Catholic Social Thought: the common good.”). I certainly agree that the
point of subsidiarity is to serve the common good and to help “members of the body social,” i.e.,
subsidiarity cannot be seen as a religiously-sanctioned libertarianism in which individual
autonomy is the ultimate good. But I do believe that it reflects a judgment about human nature
such that the measure of subsidiarity is not simply whether it “works.” See infra pp. 388–90.
6. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001). To be sure, Professor Vischer and I, while agreeing on
the broader implications of subsidiarity, may well disagree on the particulars of those
implications. See infra pp. 400.
7. See infra pp. 373.
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but a principle guiding the individuals and the various orders of society. 8
It is my further suggestion that the perspectives offered by Christian
Realism can provide further guidance as to the resolution of this creative
attention and application of these principles. It too might be dismissed as a
vague counsel against, on the one hand, undue optimism and ambition
while warning against, on the other, unwarranted pessimism and
passivity—an admonition against being too hot or too cold. 9 But its counsel
of humility and care can tell us something about the limits of ambition and
remind us to see the world as it is and not how we want it to be. It reminds
us that empiricism is not simply an annoying distraction interfering with the
assertion of moral or ideological principles. What we wish for needs to be
reconciled with what can be done.
This is not to say that Catholic Social Thought—or Christian Realism—
will resolve our policy disputes. Just as subsidiarity does not compel us to
be Republicans, solidarity does not mean that God wants us to be
Democrats. In the great encyclicals on social theory, the Popes have made it
clear that the Church has no models to propose.10 While I believe that the
use of these concepts can clarify—and perhaps even reduce—our
ideological differences, it would be unrealistic—in both the Niebuhrian and
everyday sense of the word—to believe that they can eliminate them.

8. See, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate ¶ 58 (June 29, 2009), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_
20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html (“The principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked
to the principle of solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social
privatism, while the latter, without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is
demeaning to those in need.”); Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus ¶ 15 (May 1, 1991),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_
01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html (“The State must contribute to the achievement of these
goals both directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity, by
creating favourable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to
abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the
principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain limits on the autonomy of the
parties who determine working conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum
support for the unemployed worker.”)
9. One Niebuhr biographer characterized him as someone who “always confounded those
who stressed one side of his career or one segment of his standpoint at the expense of another.”
RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 294 (1985).Without fail, Fox
continues, “[h]e confused his comrades as often as his detractors.” Id. Another commentator,
commenting on President Obama’s professed admiration for Niebuhr, see infra pp. 394, writes
that Niebuhr was “at various times a patriotic war supporter, a pacifist, an interventionist, a liberal,
a socialist, a Christian realist, a pessimist, an optimist, what Robert McAfee Brown has called a
‘pessimistic optimist,’ etc. It is not feasible to hold Obama or anyone else to a Niebuhrian
standard because we cannot know what that standard might be.” Liam Julien, Niebuhr and
Obama, POL’Y REV., Apr.–May 2009, at 19, 31.
10. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 9 (“The Church does not have
technical solutions to offer . . . .”); Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 43 (“The
Church has no models to present . . . .”); Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶
41 (“[T]he Church does not propose economic or political systems . . . .”).
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It is my contention that these theological concepts offer something, if
not perspectives. Solidarity (as well as the underlying ontology of Catholic
Social Thought) suggests that we evaluate public policy by its service of the
common good as opposed to whether it can command the assent of a
majority of differing interests. It rejects agnosticism about the nature of the
good. 11 Solidarity suggests that legal and political discourse ought not to
dismiss the notion that there is a common good as opposed to mere
conflicting interests that ought to be mediated. Subsidiarity, however,
suggests that this common good requires not only the immediate
satisfaction of material wants, but the empowerment of individuals,
voluntary associations, and units of local government. Because human
beings are creative agents, the status quo is never to be taken as a given.
Over the top of this counterpoised unity, realism reminds us that we must
always be concerned not only with what law and policy causes to happen,
but what they may prevent from happening. It cautions skepticism
regarding efforts to impose some centralized view of the common good and
modesty about what human effort can accomplish.12
In this paper, I propose to use, as a starting point, what many perceive
to be a shift toward state intervention and centralized decision-making
under the Obama administration as well as its reassertion of classical
Progressive Era faith in rational administration.
II. TOP DOWN SOLUTIONS: THE QUEST FOR PERFECTION AS THE
ENEMY OF THE GOOD
According to journalist Michael Kinsley, “a gaffe is when a politician
tells the truth.” 13 President Obama’s chief of staff, Rahm Emmanuel, almost
certainly gaffed when he said, in relation to the financial meltdown that
rocked the nation in the fall of 2008, “You don’t ever want a crisis to go to
waste . . . .” 14 In Emmanuel’s view, a crisis presents “an opportunity to do
important things that you would otherwise avoid . . . .” 15 And so it does—
even if candid recognition of the fact breeds discomfort.16
11. See generally John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Social
Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513 (2009).
12. Cf. Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments In the United States, 52
VILL. L. REV. 67, 81, 109 (2007) (arguing that subsidiarity is “anti-perfectionistic” and
“substantively modest”).
13. Michael Kinsley, The Ghost of Columns Past, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 14, 1992,
at 19.
14. Jeff Zeleny & Jackie Calmes, Obama, Assembling Team, Turns to the Economy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07obama.html.
15. Id.
16. Emmanuel’s comment has brought a torrent of criticism. See, e.g., Amity Shlaes, Rahm
Emanuel’s Crisis Breeds Health-Care Trouble, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 21, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aqNQLSKwZKAM (“Rash actions
lead to reckless policies. That was a big takeaway of the economic crisis.”); Jonah Goldberg,
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But just as hard cases can make bad law, 17 crisis can lead to panic and
panic to poor judgment. Andrew Gelman has written that when a simple
system such as politics seeks to regulate a complex system such as society,
unintended consequences follow. 18 More than one American politician has
remarked in some way on the supposed Chinese wisdom that a crisis is “an
opportunity riding the dangerous wind.” 19 The danger is as real as the
Obama’s Fear Mongering, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2009, http://article.nationalreview.com/
388089/obamas-fear-mongering/jonah-goldberg (“Scaring people about X in order to achieve Y
is fundamentally undemocratic.”); Charles Krauthammer, The Great Non Sequitur, WASH. POST,
Mar.
6,
2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/05/
AR2009030502951.html (“The markets’ recent precipitous decline is a reaction not just to the
absence of any plausible bank rescue plan, but also to the suspicion that Obama sees the
continuing financial crisis as usefully creating the psychological conditions—the sense of crisis
bordering on fear-itself panic—for enacting his “Big Bang” agenda to federalize and/or socialize
health care, education and energy, the commanding heights of post-industrial society. Clever
politics, but intellectually dishonest to the core.”); David Boaz, Obama’s Shock Doctrine, THE
GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/feb/10/
obama-klein-shock-doctrine (“It’s all out of the ‘shock doctrine’ playbook: scare people to death
and then demand that your agenda be enacted without delay.”); Patterico’s Pontifications, Rahm
Emanuel: Never Allow a Crisis to Go to Waste, (Nov. 13, 2008), http://patterico.com/2008/11/13/
rahm-emanuel-never-allow-a-crisis-to-go-to-waste/ (“Is Obama’s goal to fix the crisis—or to use
it to accomplish other things that he wanted to accomplish anyway?”).
17. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.”).
18. James Quinn, The Law of Unintended Consequences: 20th Century and Beyond,
SEEKING ALPHA, Jan. 5, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/113162-the-law-of-unintendedconsequences-20th-century-and-beyond (quoting Andrew Gelman) (“The political system is
simple. It operates with limited information (rational ignorance), short time horizons, low
feedback, and poor and misaligned incentives. Society in contrast is a complex, evolving, highfeedback, incentive-driven system. When a simple system tries to regulate a complex system you
often get unintended consequences.”) .
19. Thinkexist.com, Chinese Proverbs Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/a_crisis_
is_an_opportunity_riding_the_dangerous/182149.html (last visited April 21, 2010). Indeed, at
least two Presidents have argued that the proposition is embedded in the language itself. See, e.g.,
John F. Kennedy, Remarks at the Convocation of the United Negro College Fund, Indianapolis,
Indiana,
Apr.
12,
1959,
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/
Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/JFK+Pre-Pres/189POWERS09JFKPOWEES_59APR12.htm (last
visited April 21, 2010) (“When written in Chinese, the word “crisis” is composed of two
characters—one represents danger, and one represents opportunity.”); Thinkexist.com, Richard M.
Nixon Quotes, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the_chinese_use_two_brush_strokes_to_write_
the/6945.html (last visited April 21, 2010) (“The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word
‘crisis.’ One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, be aware of the
danger - but recognize the opportunity.”). The ideographic claim is long- standing, see Frank
Gannon,
The
Future
Lies
Ahead,
The
New
Nixon
(Aug.
4,
2009),
http://thenewnixon.org/2009/08/04/the-future-lies-ahead/ (referring to the “now tired old chestnut
about the Chinese character that means both ‘crisis’ and ‘opportunity’”), and has even been
repeated on The Simpsons, The Simpsons: Fear of Flying (FOX television broadcast Dec. 18,
1994) (transcript available at http://snpp.com/episodes/2F08.html) (“Lisa: Look on the bright
side, Dad. Did you know that the Chinese use the same word for ‘crisis’ as they do for
‘opportunity’? Homer: Yes! Cris-atunity.”). The “same word” claim is apparently based on the
Mandarin character wēijī (危), but appears to be inaccurate. Victor Muir, Danger + Opportunity ≠
Crisis, Pinyin.Info: A Guide to the Writing of Mandarin Chinese in Romanticization,
http://pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (last visited on Apr. 21, 2010). I trust that the larger point
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opportunity.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the causes of our recent
financial difficulties. I suspect that they are varied and not consistent with
the ideological presuppositions of the right or the left.20 It is clear, however,
that one popular diagnosis revolves around the idea that markets are in need
of greater regulation and direction.21 On this view, the decentralized
decisions of participants in the financial marketplace are unlikely—or at
least not guaranteed—to reach a desirable equilibrium. Rather than expect
optimal outcomes to percolate from the bottom up, it may be necessary for
the state to impose—or at least to delimit—outcomes from the top down. 22
A. CENTRALIZING POLICY INITIATIVES
In the wake of the financial crisis, the outgoing Bush and new Obama
administrations proposed or enacted a number of bold policy initiatives.
Some are in response to and intended to provide relief from the downturn.23
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, passed in the waning
days of the Bush administration, committed $700 billion to purchase or
insure troubled financial assets and instruments. Major provisions of the
legislation provided the purchase of devalued or “toxic” assets from the
financial institutions holding them, thereby cleaning up their balance sheets
and, it was hoped, stimulating additional lending. 24
This aspect of the Act, the program commonly referred to as “TARP,”
the Troubled Asset Relief Program, was expanded to involve the injection
of equity into large financial institutions in return for preferred stock or

remains valid.
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey Friedman, A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics: Complexity, Ignorance
and Policy Failure, 21 CRITICAL REV. 127 (2009) (arguing that complex and interacting
regulations fostered the concentration of excessive risk); Amar Bhidé, An Accident Waiting to
Happen, 21 CRITICAL REV. 211 (2009) (blaming under-regulation of banking and overregulation
of securities).
21. See, e.g., ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: RETURN OF THE MASTER (2009); RICHARD A.
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
22. Although I often refer to state regulation as directed from “the top” and market outcomes
as emerging “from the bottom,” these terms may be less descriptive when markets are highly
concentrated or where participants engage in collusion. I express no judgment about whether these
conditions characterize the financial or any other particular market in the United States or
elsewhere. But in principle, subsidiarity may also suggest devolution from larger to smaller
private institutions, although I think application of the concept in such a context is even more
complex and well beyond the scope of this paper. As we will see, subsidiarity might certainly be
consistent with the need for state facilitation of human agency that would not be adequately
supported through private arrangements.
23. See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008).
24. For a good description of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), see Troubled Asset
Relief Program, http://troubled-asset-relief-program.net/ (last visited on Apr. 21, 2010).
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senior debt instruments. 25 Participating institutions, at least some of whom
initially resisted participation,26 have been subject to compensation
restrictions. 27 In December 2008, an executive order further expanded the
TARP program to allow its funds to be spent on any program deemed
necessary by the President to avert financial crisis.28
This led to the use of additional government funds to bail out Chrysler
and General Motors, with $17.4 billion in TARP funds eventually loaned to
the automakers. 29 That led, with stunning speed, to the acquisition of
General Motors by the federal government. 30 It led to a government
sponsored—and financed—reorganization of Chrysler, resulting in a
transfer of a majority stake to the United Auto Workers union with the
federal government retaining a minority interest.31
In the early weeks of the new administration, a stimulus bill called for
almost a trillion dollars in new spending. 32 In combination with the recently
enacted TARP program, these initiatives, if fully implemented, would have
been roughly half the size of the proposed federal budget for 2008. The
President’s 2011 budget proposal called for over a trillion dollars in
increased taxes over ten years. 33 In just three years, the proposed federal
budget has increased by almost one-third. 34 The prospect of substantial
federal control of such iconic corporations raised concerns among many
about the expanding role of the federal government.
Other initiatives, while certainly claimed to contribute to financial
prosperity, may be better understood as “opportunities” presented by a
“good crisis.” The administration’s proposed cap and trade legislation
would effectively determine carbon emission levels across much of the
economy and establish the conditions for allocating permission for such
25. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a $250 Billion Banking Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/business/economy/15bailout.html.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Jon D. McKinnon & John D. Stoll, U.S. Throws Lifeline to Detroit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122969367595121563.html. The Bush administration
turned to TARP funds after a bill authorizing funds for that purpose failed to pass the Senate.
27
Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html.
31. Michael J. de la Merced & Micheline Maynard, Fiat Deal With Chrysler Seals Swift 42Day Overhaul, N.Y.TIMES, June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/global/
11chrysler.html.
32. Getting to $787 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/STIMULUS_FINAL_0217.html.
33. CCH GROUP, CCH TAX BRIEFING: FY 2011 FEDERAL BUDGET—TAX PROPOSALS, Feb.
5, 2010, available at http://tax.cchgroup.com/legislation/2011-federal-budget.pdf.
34. Id. The proposed budget for fiscal year 2011 is $3.8 trillion. The proposed budget for
fiscal year 2008 was approximately $2.9 trillion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2008, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/tables.pdf.
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emissions. 35 It would impose new taxes of up to $200 billion per year.36 The
bill would declare—by fiat—that emissions must be reduced by 83 percent
by the year 2050, a level not seen since the turn of the twentieth century.
Those businesses unable to reduce emissions would have to purchase
emission permits from those who no longer (if they ever did) need them—
assuming such available permits exist. Failing the availability of permits,
such businesses could purchase offsets for ameliorating activities—the
nature and value of which would presumably be determined by
administrative fiat.
Although the idea of permitting private companies to trade emission
permits is a nod to decentralization, the idea of a centrally determined
emission level (as opposed to, say, a carbon tax designed to internalize the
cost of emissions) represents a significant increase in centralized
management of economic life. Even as it became clear that a cap and trade
bill, having passed in the House, might not be approved by the Senate, the
administration announced that the Environmental Protection Agency would
begin to regulate carbon emissions.37
Although cap and trade legislation may never be passed and equivalent
regulation may never be imposed, the administration has, as this article was
going to press, passed a health care bill of such a scope that its proponents
regard it as “historic” and its opponents call it “catastrophic.” I think it is
fair to say that the bill substantially overhauls the delivery of health care in
the United States. It requires employers to provide—and individuals to
purchase—health insurance plans meeting federally mandated criteria, 38
including a centralized determination of cost effectiveness. The new law
imposes substantial obligations on states both in terms of Medicaid
expansion and with respect to the establishment of insurance exchanges.
Although certainly an exaggeration, Newsweek magazine hinted at the
magnitude of several months change in proclaiming that “we are all
socialists now.” 39 Although I don’t believe that the President can properly

35. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, THE
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454), July 2009, available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf (the full text
of the statute is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
cong_bills&docid=f:h2454pcs.txt.pdf).
36. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ANALYSIS OF CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM, available at
www.openmarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/foia-release.pdf (last visited April 21, 2010)
(produced pursuant to Freedom of Information Act request by letter dated Sept. 18, 2009, from
Jennifer Beasley to Christopher Horner).
37. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Moves to Curtail Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/science/earth/01epa.html.
38. For a summary of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, see THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM – SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH
REFORM LAW (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
39. Jon Meachem & Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2009,
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be called a “socialist,” it certainly seems that the Age of Reagan has ended
and counterrevolution is in the air.
B. A NEW PROGRESSIVE ERA?
Each of these initiatives seems to involve substantial increases in the
authority and role of the federal government. Each seems to involve a
substantial increase in the centralization of decision-making and in the
determination of standards and constraints governing decision-making. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore and pass judgment on any of
them (some of which remain only tentatively defined and subject to
change), nor do I wish to argue that any particular program “violates” the
tenets of subsidiarity.
In the inaugural issue of the journal National Affairs, the Hudson
Institute’s William Schambra argues that Barack Obama is a “policy” rather
than a “program” President. 40 Schambra explains that this approach, first
identified by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, argues that:
[G]overning means not just addressing discrete challenges as they
arise, but formulating comprehensive policies aimed at giving large
social systems—and indeed society itself—more rational and
coherent forms and functions. In this view, the long-term, systemic
problems of health care, education, and the environment cannot be
solved in small pieces. They must be taken on in whole, lest the
unattended elements react against and undo the carefully
orchestrated policy measures. 41
As Moynihan put it, “everything relates to everything,” and, therefore,
“there are no social interests about which the national government does not
have some policy or other.” 42
The need for comprehensive solutions has led proponents of this
approach to chafe at our constitutional structure of limited government and
divided power. Progressive reformers throughout the twentieth century,
including most notably Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, came, in
Schambra’s words, “to denigrate the wisdom and relevance of the American
Constitution, which frustrated centralization and coordination by dispersing
governing power across the states and over the branches of government.” 43
Wilson famously wrote:
Government is not a machine; but a living thing. It falls, not under
http://www.newsweek.com/id/183663 (“As boomers age and spending grows, we will become
even more French.”).
40. William Schambra, Obama and the Policy Approach, 1 NAT’L AFF. 127 (2009),
available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/obama-and-the-policy-approach.
41. Id. at 127–28.
42. Id. at 128.
43. Id. at 130.
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the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is
accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its
environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions by
the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs offset
against each other, as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is
dependent upon their quick co-operation, their ready response to the
commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of
purpose . . . . There can be no successful government without the
intimate, instinctive co-ordination of the organs of life and
action. . . . Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in
structure and in practice. All that progressives ask or desire is
permission—in an era when “development,” “evolution,” is the
scientific word—to interpret the Constitution according to [the]
Darwinian principle. 44
In this view, the challenges of public policy are about applying the right
type of expertise. Schambra cites Progressive reformer Herbert Croly who
wrote that a “better future would derive from the beneficent activities of
expert social engineers who would bring to the service of social ideals all
the technical resources which research could discover and ingenuity could
devise.” 45
The “policy” or “classical progressive” approach tends to despair of the
messiness of the political process and the stumbling blocks it places in the
way of reform driven by professional expertise. Franklin Roosevelt, for
example, called for a “re-appraisal of values” in which property rights must
be supplanted “by the day of enlightened administration . . . .” 46 Thus, as
Paul Rahe has explained, progressives have sought the expansion of the
administrating state and the progressive impulse has been to respond to
crises “genuine and imaginary, and exploit these opportunities by
strengthening and extending the scope of the central administration in
something akin to the fashion that the old progressives had once advised.
From war, depression, and other crises, real or imagined, the administrative
state has drawn strength.” 47
Placing this in our contemporary context, Schambra writes:
Obama insists, we must come up with comprehensive policies that
account for the entire sweep of interconnected social and economic
factors contributing to the problem, and whose coordination will
contribute to its solution. Echoing Moynihan’s understanding of the
44. PAUL A. RAHE, SOFT DESPOTISM, DEMOCRACY’S DRIFT: MONTESQUIEU, ROUSSEAU,
TOCQUEVILLE, AND THE MODERN PROSPECT 249 (2009) (quoting WOODROW WILSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1908)).
45. Schambra, supra note 40, at 130.
46. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, Commonwealth Club Address, in FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT, 1882–1945, at 99–107 (Howard F. Bremer ed., 1971).
47. RAHE, supra note 44, at 256.
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implications of the policy approach, Obama suggests that tackling
only isolated pieces of the problem, or trying to solve only one
problem at a time, will merely introduce further distortions into
what should be treated as a unified and coordinated system. A
comprehensive policy approach will enable us to take maximum
advantage of natural- and social-science expertise, displacing
expensive or ineffective local practices by spreading system-wide
those programs that have proven to be more effective and less
expensive, as documented by thorough research and
experimentation.48
In the President’s view, “selfishness or ideological rigidity has led us to
look at the problem in isolated pieces rather than as an all-encompassing
system; we must put aside parochialism to take the long systemic view” and
must “formulate a uniform national policy supported by empirical and
objective data rather than shallow, insular opinion . . . .” 49 Thus, in his New
Foundations speech delivered at Georgetown University, President Obama
argues that the pillar of economic prosperity is composed of interacting and
interconnected federal policy in the areas of education, health care, the
environment, financial regulation, and fiscal policy. 50 The President has
consistently derided political and ideological differences as “false
choices” 51 and has consistently committed the specifics of reform—the
precise nature of a cap and trade system, the specifics of “bending” the
health care cost curve, the manner in which the structural deficit is to be
addressed—to subsequent administrative determination. 52
48. Schambra, supra note 40, at 135.
49. Id. at 136–37.
50. Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Address at Georgetown
University: A New Foundation for the Economy (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/04/14/a_new_foundation_for_the_economy_
obama_48911.html.
51. Christopher Beam, The Fallacy of False Choices: Why Obama’s Favorite Rhetorical Tic
Can Be Misleading, SLATE, Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2238074/ (collective
examples) (rejecting “stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests [and] an endless
campaign to impose our values around the world . . . .”) (“[W]e reject as false the choice between
our safety and our ideals.”) (rejecting the idea that we must “choose between paying down our
deficits on the one hand, and investing in job creation and economic growth on the other. This is a
false choice”) (“[Obama] reject[s] the false choice between securing this nation and wasting
billions of taxpayer dollars . . . .”) (“[W]e need not choose between a chaotic and unforgiving
capitalism and an oppressive government-run economy . . . .”) (“Our government has forced what
[Obama] believe[s] is a false choice between sound science and moral values . . . .”) (“There’s
been a tension between those who have sought to conserve our natural resources for the benefit of
future generations, and those who have sought to profit from these resources. But [Obama is] here
to tell you this is a false choice.”).
52. Charles R. Kesler, The Tea Party Spirit, 10 CLAREMONT REV. OF BOOKS 1, 3 (2010)
(noting that the health care reform bill contains “scores of places where power is delegated to
administrative agencies and special boards, which are charged to fill the gaps in the written
legislation by promulgating thousands, if not tens of thousands, of new pages of regulations that
will then be applied to individual cases”).
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III. THE YIN AND YANG: SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY
A. SUBSIDIARITY: THE VALUE OF DECENTRALIZATION
The idea of subsidiarity has a long pedigree in Catholic social teaching.
First hinted at by Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum Novarum, 53 it was
expressly set forth by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For
every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the
members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them. 54
In this, Pius XI echoed Leo XIII’s admonition that “the State must not
absorb the individual or the family” 55 and “the law must not undertake
more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the
removal of the mischief . . .” 56 that lead to the need for intervention.
The idea has been repeated in subsequent encyclicals and is a well
accepted principle of the Church’s social teaching. Pope John XXIII wrote
of the importance of “the founding of a great many such intermediate
groups” 57 and Paul VI warned that “[r]ulers must be careful not to hamper
the development of family, social or cultural groups nor that of intermediate
bodies or organizations . . . .” 58 As noted above, Pope John Paul II
emphasized the importance of the concept in Centesimus Annus, explaining
that “the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is
realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and
including economic, social, political and cultural groups, which stem from
human nature itself and have their own autonomy.” 59 The Compendium of
the Social Doctrine of the Church calls subsidiarity “one of the most
constant and characteristic directives of the Church’s social doctrine . . .
present since the first great social encyclical.” 60 Most recently, Pope
53. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum ¶¶ 13–14 (May 15, 1891), available at http://www.
vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_
en.html.
54. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 2, ¶ 79.
55. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, supra note 53, ¶ 35.
56. Id. ¶ 36.
57. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris ¶ 24 (Apr. 11, 1963), available at http://www.
vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.
html.
58. Pope Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World—Gaudium et
Spes ¶ 75 (Dec. 7, 1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_
council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
59. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 13.
60. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the
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Benedict XVI called subsidiarity “an expression of inalienable human
freedom,” 61 and “the most effective antidote against any form of allencompassing welfare state.” 62
It is important to note, as Pius XI and his successors insisted, that
subsidiarity applies not only to create a presumption in favor of the freedom
of individuals, but also to “lesser” or “smaller” associations into which
individuals may organize themselves. As the Compendium puts it:
It is impossible to promote the dignity of the person without
showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local
territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social,
cultural, sports-oriented, recreational, professional and political
expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which
make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth.63
Richard John Neuhaus and Peter Berger have called those voluntary
associations standing between men and women and the mega-structures of
society “intermediary institutions” and argued that they serve as antidotes to
the alienation associated with larger institutions. 64 In their view, large
mega-structures, including but not limited to the state, fail to provide
“meaning and identity for individual existence.” 65 Recognition of the value
such “mediating” institutions is not limited to subsidiarity. The Calvinist
notion of sphere sovereignty claims that there are social spheres — the
state, the church, the family, for example —that are autonomous in their
areas of responsibility. 66 Tocqueville regarded “associationalism”—the
existence of robust voluntary associations—as among the signal strengths
of American democracy. 67 These institutions stand between the individual
and large institutions such as the state and that fact is seen as both
protecting and empowering the individual.
The notion is that support for a free market and decentralized
government is epistemic—i.e., based on the idea that “[w]e cannot know
enough to produce the outcomes we desire by forethought and deliberations
Church ¶ 81 (2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/
justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html [hereinafter
Compendium].
61. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 57.
62. Id.
63. Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 185.
64. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977).
65. Id.
66. ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 90 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. 1970)
(1931).
67. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 123 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Arlington House 1966) (1835) ("[America] is the only [country] in the world where the continual
exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life, and where all the advantages
which civilization can confer are procured by means of it.").
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without doing more harm than good.” 68 Centralized decision- makers
cannot possibly know enough to direct activities with which they are not
directly involved; in complex and diverse societies, dispersing authority
among a variety of public and private actors is more likely to result in good
decisions.
There is, as will be explored in more detail later, subsidiarity offers
more than merely instrumental value. There is also a sense of
empowerment, not simply to serve the autonomy of the individuals whose
liberty is unimpeded, but to allow each to participate in the definition and
advancement of the common good. John McGinnis, for example, sees
intermediary institutions as generators of alternative values. That these
values might generate a spontaneous order—or what Friedrich Hayek called
catallaxy69—is one of the posited values of free markets. There is certainly
support, if not unqualified endorsement, for this idea in the social
encyclicals. It is part of the value of subsidiarity, although, as we will see,
not its full measure. 70
This may certainly have “jurisdictional” or even “conservative”
implications. John Courtney Murray wrote:
Rerum novarum, adhering to the Western Christian political
tradition, makes it clear that government, strictly speaking, creates
nothing; that its function is to order, not to create. Perhaps more
exactly, its function is to create the conditions of order under which
original vitalities and forces, present in society, may have full scope
to create the values by which society lives. Perhaps still more
exactly, the only value which government per se is called upon to
create is the value of order. But the value of order resides primarily
in the fact that it furnishes opportunitates, facilitates . . . for the
exercise of the freedoms which are the rightful prerogative of other
social magnitudes and forces. These freedoms, rightly ordered, are
the true creative sources of all manner of social values.71
It is quite common, in the American context, for conservatives (or those
offering a “conservative” critique of centralized economic regulation) to
criticize such strategies as inconsistent with subsidiarity found in Catholic
68. MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 256 n.8
(1993).
69. Hayek used the term to “describe the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of
many individual economies in a market.” FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
107–09 (1976) (forming the word from the Greek verb “katallattein . . . which meant,
significantly, not only ‘to exchange’ but also ‘to admit into the community’ and ‘to change from
enemy into friend.’”). While hardly endorsing an untrammeled free market, the social encyclicals
recognize that profit may be a way of knowing that needs have been fulfilled. Pope John Paul II,
Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 35.
70. See infra pp. 387–90.
71. John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII and Pius XII: Government and the Order of Religion, in
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: CATHOLIC STRUGGLES WITH PLURALISM 49, 78 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1993).

100524 Esenberg Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

384

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 9:12 PM

[Vol. 7:2

Social Thought 72based almost entirely on what are seen to be subsidiarity’s
claims. While I may welcome this observation from my brothers and sisters
on the right, I cannot end with it.
As a merely jurisdictional principle, subsidiarity is highly indefinite.
While it “inculcates a steady bias toward decentralization, freedom, and
initiative,” 73 subsidiarity also admits of the need for higher authorities to
assist lower ones. This aspect has been said to justify much in the way of
state intervention, and, even, in some encyclicals, to call for stronger
structures of global governance and authority. 74 Even in Centesimus Annus,
arguably the most “pro-market” of the Church’s social encyclicals, Pope
John Paul II wrote:
Economic activity, especially the activity of a market economy,
cannot be conducted in an institutional, juridical or political
vacuum. On the contrary, it presupposes sure guarantees of
individual freedom and private property, as well as a stable
currency and efficient public services. Hence the principle task of
the State is to guarantee this security, so that those who work and
produce can enjoy the fruits of their labours and thus feel
encouraged to work efficiently and honestly. The absence of
stability, together with the corruption of public officials and the
spread of improper sources of growing rich and of easy profits
deriving from illegal or purely speculative activities, constitutes one
of the chief obstacles to development and to the economic order.75
The state, it seems, may have a “duty to sustain business activities by
creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities, by stimulating
those activities where they are lacking or by supporting them in moments of
crisis.” 76 While it is “wrong to assign a larger and higher organization
functions that smaller and lower bodies can perform sufficiently well,” 77
subsidiarity does not tell us what those functions are.
Catholic Social Thought tends to view the state, its elements, and
private institutions as an organic whole, rather than as Madison’s competing
factions. Thus, while the state may not do what the individuals or the lower
orders can do for themselves or are within their sphere of responsibility,
there are things that only the state can do78 and there are circumstances in
72. See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 6, at 104 (collecting examples); Robert A. Sirico,
Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and Application, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549 (1997).
73. Francis Canavan, The Popes and the Economy, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 429, 437 (1997).
74. See, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 67.
75. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 48.
76. Id.
77. Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 2, at ¶ 79.
78. Id. ¶ 80 ("Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those
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which the state may facilitate—or remove obstacles to—the work of lower
orders.
B. SOLIDARITY: THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY
The matter is further complicated by the emphasis of Catholic Social
Teaching on solidarity, that is, the idea that social justice requires regard for
the well-being of all persons. Catholic Social Teaching has long
emphasized the universal destination of goods.79 Thus Pope John Paul II
wrote that while subsidiarity might suggest the importance of “the free
exercise of economic activity,” solidarity calls upon the state to defend the
weakest. 80 Solidarity is often treated as a virtue, something that ought to
inform and guide decision making by various decision makers. It is, for
example, a duty of private as well as public bodies.81
But the Church’s social encyclicals are replete with references to the
need for state intervention in economic matters in the interest of “social
justice” and to the need for higher authorities to intervene in order to
“facilitate” the ability of lower orders to fulfill their intended purposes.
Although this requirement is not properly understood as a warrant for
radical equality82 or socialism, 83 it may certainly provide support for state
intervention in support of the economically disadvantaged:
The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both
directly and indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of
subsidiarity, by creating favourable conditions for the free exercise
of economic activity, which will lead to abundant opportunities for
employment and sources of wealth. Directly and according to the
principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing certain
limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working
conditions, and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum
support for the unemployed worker. 84
Insistence upon “social justice” and a “preferential option for the

things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them").
79. Pope Paul VI, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World—Gaudium et
Spes, supra note 59, ¶ 69 ("God destined the earth and all it contains for all men and all peoples so
that all created things around be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice
tempered by charity."). See generally Compendium, supra note 60, ¶¶ 171–84.
80. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
81. Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 193 (providing that solidarity is “a moral requirement
inherent within all human relationships”).
82. See Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
83. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 10, ¶ 40 ("[B]usiness management
cannot concern itself only with the interests of the proprietors, but must also assume responsibility
for all the other stakeholders who contribute to the life of the business: the workers, the clients, the
suppliers of various elements of production, the community of reference.").
84. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
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poor” 85 has also been said to justify substantial “top down” intervention by
the state. 86
The Church has defended the right to private property, but has, at the
same time, emphasized the universal destination of all goods. The state is
entitled to—and should—intervene to protect the weak. It may—and
should—act to “ensure wage levels adequate for the maintenance of the
worker and his family” 87 and to “block shameful forms of exploitation,
especially to the disadvantage of the most vulnerable workers, of migrants,
and those on the margins of society.” The social encyclicals have long
emphasized notions of distributive and social justice.
C. THE INDETERMINANCY OF SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY.
Thus, may the irresistible force of subsidiarity seem to meet the
irresistible force of solidarity. Solidarity recognizes “the social
responsibility of humans” and a “rejection of individualism,” 88 but
subsidiarity calls for “the responsibility of people and intermediary
communities.” 89 Respecting the autonomy of lower orders—local
governments or private associations, for example—may lead to some
degree of inequality that is either thought to be unacceptable or greater than
that which could be obtained (at least in theory) by state intervention. These
positions are not contradictory, but they are at best, dialectical, and at worst,
confounding.
The operation of markets may undermine the efficacy of mediating
structures and leave individuals unable—due to poverty or want of
education—to fully exercise their own subjectivity. Decentralization can
empower individuals and associations, but it may also simply leave the loss
where it lies. It may result in the hegemony of institutions—for example,
monopolists or the media or the socially dislocating operation of the
85. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 42.
86. See, e.g., National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Nov. 13, 1986), available at
http://usccb.org/sdwp/international/EconomicJusticeforAll.pdf.
87. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 15.
88. Vischer, supra note 6, at 110 (quoting J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in
PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 133 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998)). But
individualism ought not to be confused with individual liberty. The latter sees autonomy not as an
end in itself, but as a necessary (i.e., not simply to be cast aside when it might not seem to be
working) condition to a greater good. See Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 192 (“Solidarity
highlights in a particular way the intrinsic social value of the human person, the equality of all in
dignity and the rights and the common path of individuals and peoples towards an ever more
common unity.”).
89. Vischer, supra note 6, at 110; see Compendium, supra note 60, ¶ 185 (“It is impossible to
promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations,
local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sports-oriented,
recreational, professional and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and
which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth.”).
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market—that undermines the freedom of individuals and usurps the role of
intermediary institutions.
But interventions to accomplish a greater degree of equality may
impinge upon the prerogatives of individuals and lower orders. One cannot
simply brush this off by saying that any intervention that is intended to lead
to a “better” or more egalitarian result is reserved to a higher order without
rendering subsidiarity meaningless.
Pope John Paul II came closest to proposing an economic policy in
Centesimus Annus:
If by ‘capitalism’ is meant an economic system which recognizes
the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private
property and the resulting responsibility for the means of
production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector,
then the answer is certainly in the affirmative, even though it would
perhaps be more appropriate to speak of a ‘business economy’,
‘market economy’ or simply ‘free economy’. But if by ‘capitalism’
is meant a system in which freedom in the economic sector is not
circumscribed within a strong juridical framework which places it
at the service of human freedom in its totality, and which sees it as
a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and
religious, then the reply is certainly negative. 90
It would be difficult to find any mainstream political figure in the
United States who would disagree.
III. THE UNITY OF SUBSIDIARITY AND SOLIDARITY
There is no way out of this bind, but perhaps we can find a way to
mediate the inevitable conflict. It remains my contention that subsidiarity
does provide an important heuristic by which to evaluate such proposals.
Subsidiarity is, in my view, particularly useful in counteracting the
particular temptations inherent in seeing crisis as opportunity or the natural
tendency to see crises as more readily preventable than they are. It does so
not merely by creating a rule or presumption of decentralization, but by
making claims about both the instrumental and intrinsic value of the
empowerment of individuals and the various associations and institutions
into which they gather.
It is not simply a judgment about what works, but about what is
authentically human. If solidarity implies the value of every human life,
then subsidiarity claims that each of us is, at least potentially, efficacious—
that is, we are not simply objects of assistance, but also subjects capable of
transcending our present circumstance. Subsidiarity emphasizes the
subjectivity of the human person as someone who is not only acted upon
90. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 42.

100524 Esenberg Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

388

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 9:12 PM

[Vol. 7:2

and served but as someone who acts and serves. Human freedom is
extrinsically valuable because it allows for full development of the human
person.
Thus, in Populorum Progressio, Pope Paul VI noted that it is not
enough to increase the general fund of wealth and distribute it more fairly:
“Man is truly human only if he is the master of his own actions and the
judge of their worth, only if he is the architect of his own progress. He must
act accordingly to his God-given nature, freely accepting its potentials and
its claims upon him.” 91
As noted earlier, Pope John Paul II has written that the social nature of
man is not fulfilled in the state, 92 but in the intermediary associations of
which he is a part. It is by having “something he can call ‘his own’ and the
possibility of earning a living through his own initiative” that he recognizes
“his dignity as a person” and builds an “authentic human community.” 93
This initiative is “important not only for the individual, but also for the
common good.” 94 Only when it is free can development be “integrally
human.” 95
Indeed, the Latin word “subsidium” means “support, assistance, aid,
help, protection . . . .” 96 and the notion of subsidiarity seems to be more
about the allocation of responsibility than checks and balances.97 The
“service” to be provided, however, is not that of the lower orders fulfilling
the objectives of those institutions higher in the chain of command, but of
the higher ones. It is for them to offer assistance and not command. 98 Thus,
the underpinnings of subsidiarity are not simply jurisdictional and it is not
right to view it simply as a protection against the concentration of power
(even though it may serve that purpose). While one might say that the
primary role the state plays in assuring solidarity is to provide a “juridical
framework” for society and economy, and not take over their proper
functions, the point is that there is intrinsic value in empowering the
91. Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio ¶ 34 (March 26, 1967), available at http://www.
vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.
html.
92. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 13.
93. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 13.
94. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 14.
95. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 17.
96. See Charton T. Lewis & Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, available at http://www.
perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=subsidium&la=la#lexicon.
97. Indeed subsidiarity is seen as “a form of assistance to the human person via the autonomy
of intermediate bodies.” Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 57.
98. Gregory Beabout and Mary Catherine Hodes trace the word to the Roman “subsidium,” a
group of military leaders that would sit behind those planning an operation in case extra support
was needed. Gregory R. Beabout & Mary Catherine Hodes, John Paul II on the Relationship
Between Civil Law and the Moral Law: Understanding Evangelium Vitae in Light of the Principle
of Subsidiarity and the Moral Grammar of John Paul II, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 71, 87 (2007).
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“lower” orders. Subsidiarity is not a matter of devolution because it does
not involve the granting or delegation of powers from a higher power to a
lower.
This leads to my first claim. Subsidiarity is not simply instrumental. It
makes a moral claim. It is not simply a statement about what will “work”—
that is, a claim that those closest to a problem will tend to reach the “best”
solution. Nor is it merely a claim that devolution is necessary to check the
inevitable abuse of centralized power. While neither of these observations
are wrong, subsidiarity is a good in and of itself for it fully recognizes
persons as subjects, rather than objects. Tracing the idea in the writings of
John Paul II, Michael Novak writes:
The underlying principle of the Polish Pope’s anthropology is the
‘creative subjectivity’ of the human person, together with the
resulting ‘subjectivity of society.’ From his earliest work on,
including his phenomenological inquiry The Acting Person, the
Pope had been struck by the human being’s most arresting
characteristic: his or her capacity to originate action; that is, to
imagine and to conceive of new things and then to do them. He
found in creative acts the clue to human identity. Humans, he held,
cannot take refuge from this responsibility by hiding behind
‘society’—there, too, they are responsible for their acts. Being in
society does not absolve them of the burdens of subjectivity. 99
Novak argues that “[i]t is an affront to human dignity for a social
system to repress the human capacity to create, to invent and to be
enterprising.” 100
This is most readily seen in the Church’s criticism of socialism. The
problem is not simply that it failed to achieve social justice or to produce
economic abundance (though it did fail on both accounts), but that it
disregarded the subjectivity of its citizens, treating them as interchangeable
cogs in social machinery or as objects of state beneficence. Socialism was
based on a faulty anthropology. The denial of economic initiative
“diminishes, or in practice absolutely destroys the spirit of initiative, that is
to say, the creative subjectivity of the person.” 101 This results not in true
equality but a “leveling down” and “in the place of creative initiative, there
appears passivity, dependence and submission . . . .” 102 In doing so, it
produced an enervated citizenry; men and women who were not fully able
to realize their human potential.
This suggests, it seems to me, that we ought to be concerned with not
only the purpose of an intervention by a higher order, but also its (often
99.
100.
101.
102.

NOVAK, supra note 68, at 117.
Id.
Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 15.
Id.
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unintended) impact. With Frederic Bastiat, we must acknowledge both the
seen and unseen; what has happened and what has not. 103 While a social
safety net is imperative, perhaps we should be more concerned with
empowerment than leveling. We ought to be wary of replacing opportunity
with security. Indeed, recent encyclicals also criticize what they call the
Social Assistance State. “By intervening and depriving society of its
responsibility,” it “leads to a loss of human energy . . . .” 104 The rationale
for intervention is at its weakest when it is premised on a claim that a higher
order can better accomplish what can be accomplished by a lower one or is
in a better position to determine what is “right.”
In Centesimus Annus, John Paul II told us that, in the production of
wealth, “the decisive factor is increasingly man himself, that is, his
knowledge, especially his scientific knowledge, his capacity for interrelated
and compact organization, as well as his ability to perceive the needs of
others and to satisfy them.” 105 Policy cannot be evaluated without regard for
its effect on human incentives and innovation.
But there is more than that. Solidarity reminds us that this subjectivity
is shared by all persons and, in Novak’s terms, all must have a real
opportunity to “create, to invent and to be enterprising.” As John Courtney
Murray wrote, even in a decentralized regime, the state may have a positive
duty, not to create, but to “facilitate,” and that may justify intervention to
aid—rather than to supplant—the functions of the lower orders. 106
Recognition that “one’s neighbor is the loving image of God” suggests,
with solidarity, that policy cannot be evaluated without regard to its impact
on the capacity to give as many opportunities as possible to participate.
IV. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIAN REALISM
If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, 107 Christian Realism
may help us to understand why. I define Realism as the recognition that, in
our fallen world, there must be humility in human endeavors and a
recognition that sin is intractable and can arise from even our best
intentions. But Realism also cautions against retreat from the concerns of
the world and abandonment of the demands of justice. Thus, like the yin
and yang of subsidiarity and solidarity, it will rarely point to specific policy
results or legal outcomes. It, too, is a perspective, rather than a prescription.
103. FREDERIC BASTIAT, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (Seymour Cain trans., Irvington-on-Hudson 1995) (1848).
104. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 8, ¶ 48.
105. Id. ¶ 32.
106. See supra p. 383.
107. The origin of the phrase is most often attributed to Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–
1153), who wrote that “Hell is full of good intentions or desires.” See The Road to Hell is Paved
With Good Intentions: Not Samuel Johnson!, http://www.samueljohnson.com/road.html (last
visited Apr. 22, 2010).
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Indeed, one of Reinhold Niebuhr’s most cited statements on the proper
stance of the Christian in public life seems to point us in at least two
directions:
We have now come to the fairly general conclusion that there is no
“Christian” economic or political system. But there is a Christian
attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. It consists on the
one hand of a critical attitude toward the claims of all systems and
schemes, expressed in the question whether they will contribute to
justice in a concrete situation; and on the other hand a responsible
attitude, which will not pretend to be God nor refuse to make a
decision between political answers to a problem because each
answer is discovered to contain a moral ambiguity in God’s sight.
We are men, not God; we are responsible for making choices
between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith,
illuminating the human scene, makes it quite apparent that there is
no pure good in history; and probably no pure evil, either. The fate
of civilizations may depend on these choices. 108
We must choose with humility, understanding our limitations. But this
“critical attitude” ought not to prevent us from choosing. We cannot be less
than human. We cannot be God.
We must, as prominent Niebuhr scholar Robin Lovin writes, “relate the
biblical demand for justice to investigations into social facts, theories about
the economy and society, and informed assessments of the probable results
of alternative courses of action.” 109 But, at the same time, realism cannot
slip into defeatism:
The naïve faith of the proletarian is the faith of the man of action.
Rationality belongs to the cool observers. There is of course an
element of illusion in the faith of the proletarian, as there is in all
faith. But it is a necessary illusion, without which some truth is
obscured. The inertia of society is so stubborn that no one will
move against it, if he cannot believe that it can be more easily
overcome than is actually the case. And no one will suffer the perils
and pains involved in the process of radical social change, if he
cannot believe in the possibility of a purer and fairer society than
will ever be established. 110
Thus, Niebuhr posits a publicly-engaged Christian in a form of
equipoise, presenting “[a]n adequate religion is always an ultimate
optimism which has entertained all the facts that lead to pessimism.” 111
108. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Theology and Political Thought in the Western World,
AND POLITICS 56 (Ronald H. Stone ed., 1968).
109. ROBIN W. LOVIN, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND CHRISTIAN REALISM 102 (1995) .
110. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY 221 (1932).
111. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS 182 (1940).

in FAITH
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So, on the one hand, Christian Realism suggests a gimlet-eyed view of
the facts. Although the social encyclicals have made clear that the moral
law is superior to the economic law, this cannot be read as a warrant to
ignore economic facts. Catholic social teaching also emphasizes truth.
Without truth, Benedict XVI tells us, charity degenerates into
sentimentality. 112 There is a moral duty not only to seek justice, but also to
learn and act in accordance with the facts on the ground. While there may
be a right to minimum material substance, there may be no corresponding
right to—or need for—“a universal agency empowered to guarantee it.”113
Catholic Social Thought is not a warrant for the adoption of wellintentioned but ineffectual policies. Father Sirico reminds us of the
distinction between the “universality of faith and the universality of social
organization.” 114
This too may have jurisdictional and even “conservative” implications.
Economists tell us that centralized decision-making inevitably suffers from
the inability of one decision maker to have enough knowledge to make
superior decisions. 115 The argument is, in part, that those who are “closer”
to a situation will have “better” knowledge of pertinent facts and interests.
But it is also a claim about the limits of human knowledge. No one person
or institution can ever know “enough” to impose a solution and better
outcomes flow the bottom up, that is, from the collection of independent
decisions made by a variety of individuals and institutions. Political
theorists tell us that public processes are likely to be captured by the
especially interested. Consultation with and cooperation among
“stakeholders” is as likely to lead collectively bargained rent seeking as is
to promotion of the common good. 116
This may impact the oft-cited claim that the “moral law” somehow
“trumps” the economic law. Taken alone, this is certainly true. But the
moral law cannot truly be formed without consideration of the economic
law. However we might see the moral value in a just wage, we cannot wish
away the consequences of a legislative mandate that conditions the creation
of a job upon its payment. While we can recognize the potential value of
labor unions as intermediary associations, this does not excuse us from a
clear-eyed appraisal of their economic impact on employment and prices.
To do otherwise would be an abdication of moral responsibility. Without a
112. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 3.
113. Id.
114. Sirico, supra note 72, at 555.
115. Michael Novak, for example, criticized Quadragesimo Anno’s call for a “directing
principle” in economic life on the grounds that such principle may not be directed toward
furthering the common good and, in any event, is unlikely to work as intended. Michael Novak,
Liberty and Social Justice: Rescuing a Virtue, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER 269, 276 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1993).
116. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 141–44 (1965).
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firm commitment to “the common good” (which must certainly include a
commitment to be effective), solidarity is, in John Paul’s terms, nothing but
a “vague feeling of compassion.” 117 According to Benedict, “[d]eeds
without knowledge are blind.” 118 While one can find examples in the
Church’s encyclicals that the “moral law” must trump the “economic law,”
Realism would seem to remind us that the moral law cannot be formed
without consideration of the economic law.
Christian Realism reminds us of this as well. Recall that Niebuhr
cautions not only against efforts to, in the words of Eric Voegelin,
“immanentize the eschaton,” 119 it also suggests that we not retreat in
despair. We need to be “realistic” while also being aware that Christians
must live in—and care for—the real world and real people.
Professor Lovin warns against an idolatry of theory on the right as well
as the left:
When the practical lesson about restraint is raised to a principle,
however, it becomes unrealistic. It substitutes the idea that
government is at best the agency of last resort for the solution of
society’s problems for a realistic evaluation of the possibilities and
limitations of the state as a center of resources, to be deployed in
specified ways for the solution of particular problems. A realism
that tempers our tendency to assume that government can solve all
our problems becomes instead the “too consistent” pessimism of
Augustinian-Lutheran realism, which sees all forms of government
as inherently limited by the need to bring under control forces of
evil which cannot be dealt with according to the norms of Christian
morality. 120
He calls for a balanced realism that would stress “the indeterminacy of
human vitalities in both their individual and their collective forms.” 121
There is much to appreciate in this. But subsidiarity, as we have seen, is
about more than devolution and defense against abuse. It is a judgment, not
only about what serves human flourishing, but also about what human
flourishing is. If subsidiarity calls for devolution or for intervention by the
state in subsidium, the purpose is to facilitate human creativity and
initiative. It is to avoid what Tocqueville called the “soft despotism” of a
state that, as Paul Rahe writes, “provides for our security, . . . foresees and
supplies our needs, . . . guides us in our principal affairs, . . . directs our
industry, . . . regulates our testaments, . . . divides our inheritances, and . . .
covers the ‘surface’ of our society ‘with a network of petty regulations—
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 38.
Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, supra note 8, ¶ 30.
ERIC VOEGLIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS 120 (1952).
LOVIN, supra note 109, at 187.
Id.

100524 Esenberg Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

394

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

10/2/2011 9:12 PM

[Vol. 7:2

complicated, minute, and uniform.’” 122 Such a state, Tocqueville warned, is
[g]enerally . . . gentle; almost never is it harsh. “It does not break
wills; it softens them, bends them, and directs them.” Only on the
rarest of occasions “does it force one to act, but it constantly
opposes itself to one’s acting on one’s own; it does not destroy, it
prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it gets in the
way: it curtails, it enervates, it extinguishes, it stupefies.” And, step
by step, relentlessly, with every passing day, as we gradually
succumb to the spirit of irresponsibility and self-indulgence, this
power grows in influence and scope, making us more and more like
“a herd of timid and industrious animals, of which the government
is the shepherd.” 123
John Paul echoed Tocqueville in warning against a paternalistic
suppression of initiative that replaces “creative initiative” with “passivity,
dependence and submission to the bureaucratic apparatus.”124
V. HOW DOES IT MATTER?
So where does this leave us? Determining when and where and how a
higher order may intervene to “assist” a lower one is not an easy task.
People of good faith can and will disagree about what will “work.” In fact,
people of good faith can and do disagree about the impact of past policies.
The Church does not propose to resolve this tension. As noted earlier,
Popes have repeatedly emphasized that she has no models to propose.125 But
it does suggest, I think, that neither the market nor the state offer
redemption. In the present context, we should not lightly presume that the
former can save us from the latter.
President Obama claims the mantle of Realism. He says that Reinhold
Niebuhr is his favorite philosopher and recognizes
the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world, and
hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our
belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as
an excuse for cynicism and inaction. I take away . . . the sense we
have to make these efforts knowing that they are hard, and not
swinging from naïve idealism to bitter realism. 126
Once again, we have a statement that few would disagree with. But, at
least to my ear, there is a certain (at least) rhetorical dissonance. In my
view, a Niebuhrian Realist ought to at least pause in the face of claims that
122. RAHE, supra note 44, at 270.
123. Id.
124. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, supra note 3, ¶ 15.
125. See supra note 8.
126. David Brooks, Obama, Gospel and Verse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, http://select.
nytimes.com/2007/04/26/opinion/26brooks.html?_r=1.
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“Yes, we can” make “this the moment” when, as he told a congregation in
South Carolina, “we can create a Kingdom right here on Earth.” 127 While
the President is certainly correct to say that we should be neither naïve nor
bitter, I believe that the lesson to be taken from Realism is not simply that
reform is “hard.” To the contrary, “making these efforts” may have—
indeed, is likely to have—unintended consequences, and there is a limit to
what we can expect “these efforts” to accomplish. We must recognize that
we act in a fallen world and human capacity often falls short of human
aims. In Bastiat’s terms, the intervention of the state or “higher orders” has
costs which are unseen.
Of course, an admonition to be “careful” is, if useful, somewhat
underdetermined. This is where Realism can now be aided by Catholic
Social Thought. On the one hand, the centralization—and resulting
restriction—of human creativity and of the scope of intermediary
associations raises moral—as well as prudential—concerns. We must be
concerned with the limitations of the power and the importance of
jurisdictional questions. This is not because subsidiarity or any theological
principle can be reduced to that, but because the empowerment of
individuals and lower orders has intrinsic, as well as instrumental, value.
We must focus on the nurturing of human agency and creativity. We ought
to recognize that persons are subjects and not merely objects whose needs
are a problem for others to solve. Their subjectivity and creativity must be
respected and abetted. Efforts to “help” must be informed by the ways in
which assistance might comprise interference and suppression.
But, at the same time, we must understand that we are indeed to be men
and women for others and that all persons possess a subjectivity and
creativity that they ought to have a real—as opposed to theoretical—right to
exercise. A critical attitude toward the administrative state ought to be
combined with a critical attitude toward markets. We ought not to make an
idol of the Ph.D. or the MBA. 128 We should proceed with humility—not
retreat in despair.
To select an example, in evaluating proposals for and enactments of
health care reform, a concern for the common good and acknowledgment of
the imperative of solidarity suggests that we may not be indifferent to the
availability of health care to all. While it may not be necessary to insure a
complete equality in access to health care, it seems clear that some access to
127. Peter Hamby, Obama: GOP Doesn’t Own Faith Issue, CNN, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.
cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/10/08/obama.faith.
128. David Brooks, The Populist Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/01/26/opinion/26brooks.html (“Ever since I started covering politics, the Democratic
ruling class has been driven by one fantasy: that voters will get so furious at people with M.B.A.’s
that they will hand power to people with Ph.D.’s. The Republican ruling class has been driven by
the fantasy that voters will get so furious at people with Ph.D.’s that they will hand power to
people with M.B.A.’s.”).
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a level of adequate care ought to be a policy imperative. Solidarity suggests
that we cannot be indifferent to the inability of others to obtain adequate
care.
But this does not mean that individuals have no obligation to contribute
to the cost of his or her care. To say otherwise would be to deny human
agency and responsibility. Recognition of this might imply that the failure
to assume this responsibility will have consequences. It would be wrong to
too readily assume that individuals are incapable of providing for and
taking control of their care.
This will only get us so far, perhaps ruling out approaches that are
entirely laissez-faire or completely statist. But there is more. We should
also be concerned about the manner in which reform might impact medical
innovation. The recognition of human agency and creativity warns against
ever assuming that the present state of affairs is static. We ought never to
assume that creativity and innovation are givens unaffected by public
policy. We should be careful about assuming that innovation and creativity
can be centrally directed. Centralization necessarily limits creativity from
the bottom (or at least outside the favored agency) and creates concerns
about the dangers of placing too much power in a small number of hands.
Perhaps we can go a bit further. As noted above, subsidiarity is not a
mere matter of jurisdiction. Soldiarity, while not imbuing the state with the
authority to (try to) create a perfect world, cautions against a doctrinaire
individualism. But recognition of the ways in which an overly ambitious
centralization of authority and standardization of policy cannot only enable
abuse but stifle creativity may have implications for talk about federalism
and structural limits on the authority of the state—both for health care
policy and beyond. . Consider the matter of federalism and structural
limitations on the authority of the state.
Nevertheless, some have seen subsidiarity as a warrant for a more
robust federalism or more substantial limitations on federal authority. 129
These writers have tended to emphasize that aspect of subsidiarity which
mirrors Realism’s skepticism about human capacities and see subsidiarity
as a protection against the dangers inherent in centralized authority
structures.
But there is also a sense in which recognition of these limitations might
have an intrinsic as well as an instrumental value. Although not writing
about subsidiarity but Tocqueville’s notion of “associationalism,” John
McGinnis 130 sees the Rehnquist Court’s strengthening of the principles of
129. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV.
795, 833 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, Liberty Misconceived: Hayek’s Incomplete Relationship
Between Natural and Customary Law, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 209, 215 (1995).
130. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).

100524 Esenberg Ready for Proofs (Schmall)

2010]

CHRISTIAN REALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY

10/2/2011 9:12 PM

397

federalism131, freedom of association 132, and the creation of additional
constitutional space for the expression of competing religiously based
norms 133 as the creation of “discovery machines” for the generation of
competing values. 134 The idea is not simply that power will be abused or
that no single authority can be expected to get things right, but that broad
participation is, in and of itself, a good thing. The view of subsidiarity
advanced here may suggest that certain constitutional provisions—the
Tenth Amendment 135, the Commerce power 136, or the Necessary and
Proper 137 clause―are not simply a bulwark against abuse or overly
ambitious power, but a facilitation of empowerment of human agency – not
simply when exercised by the government, but individually and throughout
civil society. 138
If that is so, we may wish to see these constitutional provisions not as
demarcation of predetermined spheres of authority but as tools for the
assessment of claims for federal power. The inquiry would not be whether
there is, say, a plausible connection between a congressional enactment and
interstate commerce, 139 but whether facilitation of interstate commerce—in
131. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“Violence Against Women
Act” exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause power.)
132. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (upholding ability of
private association to exclude from leadership those who it believes undermine its associational
purpose); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (associational rights of
political parties); Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000) (upholding constitutionality of viewpoint neutral government support for civil
associations).
133. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
134. McGinnis, supra note 130, at 490–91.
135. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
136. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
137. “The Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
138. In a recent book, Erwin Chemerinsky sees federalism not as a limitation on the power of
the federal government but a grant of power to many levels of government. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT (2008). It means that the federal government may act
when the states have not and, with some limitations, the state may act when the federal
government has not. The idea is not to restrict the authority of any level of government to in
deference to the authority of lower levels of government, civil society or individuals, but to
empower multiple public agencies. Whatever the merits of this idea, it has little in common with
the notion of subsidiarity discussed here.
139. An extreme “but for a nail” view of the Commerce Clause, for example, seems to have
been rejected by the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Court
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which individuals and intermediary associations engage—requires the
enacted intervention. Perhaps even a connection between regulation of local
and “noncommercial” or “noneconomic” activity and a regulatory scheme
might not be sufficient to warrant federal regulation if it unduly interferes
with the decisions of individuals or “lower” orders. Justice Kennedy, for
example, has expressed concern about using the Commerce power to
“foreclose the States from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise . . . by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the
ordinary and usual sense of that term.” 140
This may require some rethinking of current doctrine and discourse.
The Court’s modern jurisprudence on the demarcation of Congressional
authority, at least in the modern era, seems relatively unconcerned with
defining limits based upon the role and capacity of various units of
government and intermediary institutions. 141 Indeed, one might argue that
post-New Deal jurisprudence on the structural limits of federal power has
become desultorily formalist. If we can imagine a way in which an
activity—perhaps commercial, but perhaps not, if engaged in by a
sufficiently large number of people, may affect commerce (broadly defined)
among the states (also broadly defined), then the commerce power is, at
least presumptively, properly exercised without regard to much further
analysis as to whether it makes sense for a centralized determination of the
policy questions in hand. 142 There appear—or so some say—little justiciable
limitations of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper and
General Welfare clauses.143
Beyond this, in assessing the “individual mandate” of the health care
144
bill , some have argued that the legislation does something largely
unprecedented, i.e., it mandates that every citizen of the United States,
whether engaged in commercial activity or not, buy a product—the nature
upheld regulation of local—and arguably noncommercial—activity as necessary to serve a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.
140. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION
(2006) (seeking to reopen debate over whether the Constitution protects economic liberties and
confers only limited authority on Congress under the Commerce Clause); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 1 (2004) (“Since the adoption of the Constitution, courts
have eliminated clause after clause that interfered with the exercise of government power.”). But
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, at 1 (criticizing a view of federalism as a limitation of
governmental power that the author argues has been “very much followed by the Supreme Court
over the past ten years”)
142. See, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. See infra text accompanying note 155.
144. The bill requires all persons who are not insured through their employer or a public
program to purchase insurance. Failure to do so will result in the imposition of a fine to be added
to the noncompliant individual’s income tax liability. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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of which will be defined by federal fiat—or face a financial penalty. 145
Supporters of the legislation have argued either the mandate is within the
Commerce power because health care is an interstate market and mandating
the participation of young and healthy persons is necessary to reduce the
cost to those who are older and less healthy. 146 Further, the failure of these
individuals to insure will create demands on the public fisc (they will not be
allowed to go without care) and interfere with the state’s regulatory
scheme. 147 This is a rather aggressive reading of the Commerce authority—
coming perilously close (although perhaps not quite) to a claim that a
person can be regulated because his or her mere existence (or the way in
which the government might respond to it) will affect interstate commerce.
An even more expansive theory justifies the individual mandate
because if the fine is collected it is collected as a “tax” and, when it comes
to tax, anything goes. 148 To accept such a theory would be to largely
abandon the notion of structural limits on Congressional authority.
Some celebrate this. Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, for example,
see the Court’s federalism jurisprudence as “incoherent” because it serves a
set of concerns (division along geographic and state lines) that no longer
exists and that has been superseded by the demands of the modern
administrative state, an entity that is presumed necessary to rationalize
economic and social relationships.149 This seems entirely consistent with
the Obama administration as a “Policy” presidency.
To be sure, unlike the constitution of the European Union in which it is
expressly mentioned150, subsidiarity is not itself a constitutional principle in
the United States. It is nowhere to be found in the constitutional text and, at
least as formulated and expounded by the Catholic Church, could not have
been known to the Founders. Nevertheless, federalism and separation of
powers are evocative of subsidiarity (at least in its jurisdictional sense) and
Founding era document warning of the dangers of the usurpation of power
by higher orders 151 and the wisdom of the decentralization and division of

145. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Jack M. Bakin, A Healthy Debate: The
Consitutitonality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 93, 99 (2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf (“Whether such a requirement would
be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by
such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to require an
individual to purchase a good or service.”).
146. Id. at 94–95.
147. Id. at 106–08.
148. Id. at 102–05.
149. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY AND EDWARD R. RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY
AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE (2008).
150. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 8.
151. Professor McGinnis cites James Wilson’s admonition, stating that “James Wilson warned
against sacrificing the primacy of civil society on the ‘idol of government.’” McGinnis, supra note
130, at 490.
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power 152 are not hard to find. 153
Stephen Gardbaum, for example, has argued that certain decisions of
the Rehnquist Court suggest that, rather than seeing structural limitations as
merely a matter of what authority Congress has been denied, there are areas
of concurrent authority between Congress and states in which the power to
preempt state action is not unlimited but subject to a burden of proof that
Congressional jurisdiction is superior. 154 He argues that the Necessary and
Proper clause might be interpreted to requires that an exercise of
Congressional jurisdiction in an area that is concurrently within the
authority of the states, “the capabilities and interests of the states are
genuinely considered and reasonably outweighed”—a requirement
“strikingly similar” to the notion of subsidiarity as embodied in the
Mastricht Treaty. 155 As noted above, John McGinnis argues that the
Rehnquist Court ushered in a “Tocqueville jurisprudence” characterized by
a recognition that devolution of authority generates human creativity and
the generation of alternative values.156 It is beyond the scope of this paper to
analyze, for example, whether the health care bill’s individual mandate is
constitutionally permissible. My suggestion here is that, to the extent that
constitutional text and history is indeterminate, the insights of subsidiarity,
solidarity, and Realism may help us organize our thoughts.
But this hardly ends controversy over the proper role and scope of
federal authority or government in general. Robert Vischer has attempted to
use subsidiarity to argue for increased federal involvement in four areas of
policy. 157 He argued that the protection of intermediary institutions might be
aided by more aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws and greater legal
protection for collective bargaining. He saw regulation of campaign finance
as a way to counter the potential for wealth to crowd out political
participation by those who are not wealthy, and federal environmental
regulation as a way to correct an obstacle to state regulation of the
environment—that is, the tendency of competition for jobs to create a “race
to the bottom.”
Professor Vischer offers reasonable arguments in support of each of
these propositions, although none is clearly correct under the lens provided

152. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“[T]he society itself will be broken
into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the
minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.”)
153. See Vischer, supra note 6, at 123 (“From executive orders requiring that a proposed
federal action be weighed against the efficacy of state action, to congressional restraint in areas of
state regulatory competence, to judicial enforcement of state-federal boundaries, much of this
country’s political and legal landscape comports fully with subsidiarity’s ideal.”).
154. Gardbaum, supra note 129, at 796–98.
155. Id. at 835–36.
156. McGinnis, supra note 130.
157. Vischer, supra note 6, at 127–42.
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by the notions of subsidiarity and solidarity aided by the insights of
Christian Realism. To the extent that the application of antitrust law
involves management of competition by the judicially mediated “expertise
of economists,” both subsidiarity and Christian Realism might cause us to
pause and consider the plausibility that such a thing can be done. While
collective bargaining might certainly empower labor, it can also create rigid
and ossified structures that stifle innovation and exclude economic
participation by the unorganized or less productive members of society.
Campaign finance reform can be a form of incumbent protection, and
environmental regulation also, by its nature, generally requires the
centralized management of highly complex market systems.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE PRIMACY OF PARADOX
In the end, the value of our theological insights might be to make us
uncomfortable in our ideological cocoons. Life is paradoxical and so is
public policy. While solidarity calls us to seek the common good of all,
subsidiarity reminds us that the common good consists not only of the
provision of material goods and license for individuals in those matters seen
as private, but also of the exercise of authentic human creativity and
responsibility. While subsidiarity may create a preference for
decentralization and devolution, solidarity reminds us that we cannot be
indifferent to the lack of opportunity for all to exercise that responsibility
and creativity. Christian Realism reminds us of our limitations and the
moral call to be effective as well as empathic. It cautions that we think
about Bastiat’s “unseen things.” At the same time, it also warns us not to
become paralyzed by pessimism and uncertainty.
Recalling these paradoxes will not make us agree on the issues that
divide us. But it may help us talk about them.

